Fluctuations and response in financial markets: the subtle nature of ‘random’ price changes

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Abstract
Using trades and quotes data from the Paris stock market, we show that the random walk nature of traded prices results from a very delicate interplay between two opposite tendencies: long-range correlated market orders that lead to super-diffusion (or persistence), and mean reverting limit orders that lead to sub-diffusion (or anti-persistence). We define and study a model where the price, at any instant, is the result of the impact of all past trades, mediated by a non-constant ‘propagator’ in time that describes the response of the market to a single trade. Within this model, the market is shown to be, in a precise sense, at a critical point, where the price is purely diffusive and the average response function almost constant. We find empirically, and discuss theoretically, a fluctuation–response relation. We also discuss the fraction of truly informed market orders, that correctly anticipate short-term moves, and find that it is quite small.

1. Introduction
The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) posits that all available information is included in prices, which emerge at all times from the consensus between fully rational agents, that would otherwise immediately arbitrage away any deviation from the fair price [1, 2]. Price changes can then only be the result of unanticipated news and are by definition totally unpredictable. The price is at any instant of time the best predictor of future prices. One of the central predictions of EMH is thus that prices should be random walks in time, which (to a good approximation) they indeed are. This was interpreted early on as a success of EMH. However, as pointed out by Shiller, the observed volatility of markets is far too high to be compatible with the idea of fully rational pricing [3]. The frantic activity observed in financial markets is another problem: on liquid stocks, there is typically one trade every 5 s, whereas the time lag between relevant news is certainly much larger. More fundamentally, the assumption of rational, perfectly informed agents seems intuitively much too strong, and has been criticized by many [4–6]. Even the very concept of the fair price of a company appears to be somewhat dubious.

There is a model at the other extreme of the spectrum where prices also follow a pure random walk, but for a totally different reason. Assume that agents, instead of being fully rational, have zero intelligence and take random decisions to buy or to sell, but that their action is interpreted by all the others agents as potentially containing some information. Then, the
mere fact of buying (or selling) typically leads to a change of the ask $a(t)$ (or bid $b(t)$) price and hence to a change of the midpoint $m(t) = [a(t) + b(t)]/2$. In the absence of reliable information about the ‘true’ price, the new midpoint is immediately adopted by all other market participants as the new reference price around which new orders are launched. In this case, the midpoint will also follow a random walk (at least for sufficiently large times), even if trades are not motivated by any rational decision and devoid of meaningful information.

This alternative, random trading model has recently been the object of intense scrutiny, in particular as a simplified approach to the statistics of order books [8–15]. Since the order flow is a Poisson process, this assumption is quite convenient and leads to tractable analytical models [14, 16]. Perhaps surprisingly, many qualitative (and sometimes quantitative) properties of order books can be predicted using such an extreme postulate [12–14, 17, 18].

Of course, reality should lie somewhere in the middle: clearly, the price cannot wander arbitrarily far from a reasonable value, and trades cannot all be random. The interesting question is to know which of the two pictures is closest to reality and can be taken as a faithful starting point around which improvements can be perturbatively added.

In this paper, we want to argue, based on a series of detailed empirical results obtained on trade by trade data, that the random walk nature of prices is in fact highly non-trivial and results from a fine-tuned competition between two populations of traders, liquidity providers (‘market-makers’) on the one hand, and liquidity takers (sometimes called ‘informed traders’, but we will argue below that this might be a misnomer). For reasons that we explain in more detail below, liquidity providers act so as to create anti-persistence (or mean reversion) in price changes that would lead to a sub-diffusive behaviour of the price, whereas liquidity takers’ action leads to long-range persistence and super-diffusive behaviour. Both effects very precisely compensate and lead to an overall diffusive behaviour, at least to a first approximation, such that between any two trades there is at least one quote. However, one can spot the vestiges of this subtle compensation from the temporal structure of the market impact function (which measures how a given trade affects future prices on average).

The organization of this paper is as follows. We first present (section 2) our empirical results on the statistics of trades, market impact and fluctuations. We show in particular that the order flow exhibits long-range (power-law) autocorrelations in time, but that this does not lead to any predictability in price changes, as also recently noticed in [7]. Then, we introduce in section 3 a simple model that expresses the price as a linear superposition of the impact of each trade. We show that this model allows us to rationalize our empirical findings, provided a specific relation between the temporal autocorrelation of the sign of the trades (i.e. buyer initiated or seller initiated) and the temporal response to a single trade is satisfied. Finally, in section 4, we give intuitive arguments that allow one to understand the market forces at the origin of this subtle balance between two opposite effects, which dynamically leads to absence of statistical arbitrage opportunities. We argue that, in a very precise sense, the market is sitting on a critical point; the dynamical compensation of two conflicting tendencies is similar to other complex systems such as the heart [19], driven by two antagonistic systems (sympathetic and para-sympathetic), or certain human tasks, such as balancing of a long stick [20].

The latter example illustrates very clearly the idea of dynamical equilibrium, and shows how any small deviation from perfect balance may lead to strong instabilities. This near instability may well be at the origin of the fat tails and volatility clustering observed in financial data (see e.g. [21–26]). Note that these two features are indeed present in the ‘balancing stick’ time series studied in [20].

2. Market impact and fluctuations

2.1. Presentation of the data and definitions

In this study, we have analysed trades and quotes data from liquid French stocks in the years 2001 and 2002, although qualitatively similar results were also obtained on British stocks as well. The advantage of the French market, however, is that it is fully electronic, whereas only part of the volume is traded electronically in the London stock exchange. We will illustrate our results mainly using the France-Telecom stock, which is one of the most actively traded stocks, for which statistics are particularly good.

There are two data files for each stock: one gives the list of all successive quotes, i.e. the best buy (bid, $b$) and sell (ask, $a$) prices, together with the available volume, and the time stamp accurate to the second. A quote can change either as a result of a trade, or because new limit orders appear, or else because some limit orders are cancelled. The other data file is the list of all successive trades, with the traded price, traded volume and time stamp, again accurate to the second. Sometimes, several trades are recorded at the very same instant but at different prices: this corresponds to a market order of a size which exceeds the available volume at the bid (or at the ask), and hits limit orders deeper in the order book. In the following, we have grouped all these trades together as a single trade. This allows one to create chronological sequences of trades and quotes, such that between any two trades there is at least one quote.

The last quote before a given trade allows one to define the sign of each trade: if the traded price is above the last midpoint $m = (a + b)/2$, this means that the trade was triggered by a market order (or marketable limit order) to buy, and we will assign to that trade a variable $\varepsilon = +1$. If, on the other hand, the traded price is below the last midpoint $m = (a + b)/2$, then $\varepsilon = -1$. With each trade is also associated a volume $V$, corresponding to the total number of shares exchanged.

Trades appear at random times, the statistics of which is itself non-trivial (there are intraday seasonalties and also clustering of the trades in time). We will not be interested in this aspect of the problem and always reason in terms of trade time, i.e. time advances by one unit every time a new trade (or a series of simultaneous trades) is recorded. We have also

4 That this simplistic model also leads to a random walk behaviour for prices has also very recently been pointed out in [7].
systematically discarded the first ten and the last ten minutes of trading in a given day, to remove any artifacts due to the opening and closing of the market. Many quantities of interest in the following are two-time observables, that is, compare two observables at (trade) time \( n \) and \( n + \ell \). In order to avoid overnight effects, we have restricted our analysis mostly to intraday data, i.e. both \( n \) and \( n + \ell \) belong to the same trading day. We have also assumed that our observables only depend on the time lag \( \ell \).

In the example of France-Telecom, on which we will focus mostly, there are on the order of 100 000 trades during 2002 was close to 2. For example, the total number of trades on France-Telecom on the time lag day. We have also assumed that our observables only depend

2.2. Price fluctuation and diffusion

The simplest quantity to study is the average mean square fluctuation of the price between (trade) time \( n \) and \( n + \ell \). Here, the price \( p_n \) is defined as the mid-point just before the \( n \)th trade: \( p_n \equiv m_n \). In this paper, we always consider detrended prices, such that the empirical drift is zero. We thus define \( D(\ell) \) as

\[
D(\ell) = \langle (p_{n+\ell} - p_n)^2 \rangle.
\]

As is well known, in the absence of any linear correlations between successive price changes, \( D(\ell) \) has a strictly diffusive behaviour, i.e.

\[
D(\ell) = D \ell,
\]

where \( D \) is a constant. In the presence of short-range correlations, one expects deviations from this behaviour at short times. However, on liquid stocks with relatively small tick sizes such as France-Telecom (FT), one finds a remarkably linear behaviour for \( D(\ell) \), even for small \( \ell \). The absence of linear correlations in price changes is compatible with the idea that (statistical) arbitrage opportunities are absent, even for high-frequency trading. In fact, in order to emphasize the differences from a strictly diffusive behaviour, we have studied the quantity \( \sqrt{D(\ell)/\ell} \) (which has the dimension of Euros). We show this quantity in figure 1 for FT, averaged over three different periods: the first semester of 2001 (where the tick size was 0.05 Euros), the second semester of 2001 and the whole of 2002 (where the tick size was 0.01 Euros). One sees that \( D(\ell)/\ell \) is indeed nearly constant, with a small ‘oscillation’ on which we will comment later. Similar plots can be observed for other stocks (see figure 2).

The conclusion is that the random walk (diffusive) behaviour of stock prices appears even at the trade by trade level, with a diffusion constant \( D \) which is of the order of the typical bid–ask spread. From figure 1, one indeed sees that \( \sqrt{D(T)} \sim 0.01 \) Euros, which is precisely the tick size, whereas FT has an average bid–ask spread equal to two ticks. Hence, each transaction typically moves the mid-point by half the bid–ask.
where $\varepsilon_n$ is the sign of the $n$th trade, introduced in section 2.1. The quantity $R(\ell)$ measures how much, on average, the price moves up conditioned to a buy order at time zero (or a sell order moves the price down) a time $\ell$ later. As will be clear below, this quantity is however not the market response to a single trade, a quantity that will later be denoted by $G_0$. A more detailed object can in fact be defined by conditioning the average to a certain volume $V$ of the $n$th trade:

$$R(\ell, V) = \langle (p_{n+\ell} - p_n)\varepsilon_n \rangle \big|_{V_n=V}.$$  

Previous empirical studies have mostly focused on the volume dependence of $R(\ell, V)$, and established that this function is strongly concave as a function of the volume $[7, 27–30]$. In [31], a thorough analysis of US stocks was performed in terms of a piecewise power-law dependence for $R(\ell = 1, V) \propto V^\alpha$, with an exponent $\alpha \simeq 0.4$ for small volumes, and a smaller value ($\alpha \simeq 0.2$) for larger volumes (see also [32]). In a previous publication [33], two of us have proposed that this dependence might in fact be logarithmic (see also a footnote in [30]): $R(\ell = 1, V) = R_1 \ln V$ (where $R_1$ is a stock dependent constant), a law that seems to satisfactorily account for all the data that we have analysed. The empirical determination of the temporal structure of $R(\ell, V)$ has been much less investigated (although one can find in [30] somewhat related results on a coarse-grained version of $R(\ell, V)$). Preliminary empirical results, published in [33], reported that $R(\ell, V)$ could be written in a factorized form (first suggested on theoretical grounds in [12]):

$$R(\ell, V) \approx R(\ell) f(V); \quad f(V) \propto \ln V,$$  

where $R(\ell)$ is a slowly varying function that initially increases up to $\ell \sim 100–1000$ and then is seen to decrease back, with a rather small overall range of variation. The initial increase of $R(\ell)$ was reported in [27] and has also recently been noticed by Lillo and Farmer [17]. Here, we provide much better data that supports both the above assertions. We show for example in figure 3 the temporal structure of $R(\ell)$ for France-Telecom, for different periods. Note that $R(\ell)$ increases by a factor $\sim 2$ between $\ell = 1$ and $\ell^* \approx 1000$, before decreasing again. Including overnights allows one to probe larger values of $\ell$ and confirm that $R(\ell)$ decreases, and even becomes negative beyond $\ell \simeq 5000$ (why this may be so will be explained by our model). Similar results have been obtained for many different stocks as well: figure 4 shows a small selection of other stocks, where the non-monotonic behaviour of $R(\ell)$ is shown. However, in some cases (such as Pechiney), the maximum is not observed. One possible reason is that the number of daily trades is in this case much smaller ($\sim 1000$), and that $\ell^*$ is beyond the maximum intraday time lag. On the other hand, the model discussed below does also allow for monotonic response functions.

The existence of a timescale $\ell^*$ beyond which $R(\ell)$ decreases is thus both statistically significant, and to a large degree independent of the considered stock. On the other hand, the amplitude of the change of $R(\ell)$ seems to be stock dependent. As will be clear later, the fact that $R(\ell)$ slowly increases before decreasing back to negative values is a non-trivial result that requires a specific interpretation.

Turning now to the factorization property of $R(\ell, V)$, equation (5), we illustrate its validity in figure 5, where $R(\ell, V)/f(V)$ is plotted as a function of $\ell$ for different values of $V$. The function $f(V)$ was chosen for best visual rescaling, and is found to be close to $f(V) = \ln V$, as expected. Note that for the smallest volume (open circles) the long-time behaviour of $R(\ell, V)$ seems to be different, which is probably due to the fact that small volumes are in fact more likely to be large volumes chopped up into small pieces.

*Figure 3. Average response function $R(\ell)$ for FT, during three different periods (full symbols). We have given error bars for the 2002 data. For the 2001 data, the y-axis has been rescaled to best collapse onto the 2002 data. Using the same rescaling factor, we have also shown the data of figure 1. The fact that the same rescaling works approximately for $D(\ell)$ as well will be considered further in section 2.5 below.*

*Figure 4. Average response function $R(\ell)$ for a restricted selection of stocks, during the year 2002.*

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2.4. Fraction of informed trades

One has to keep in mind that the above response function $\mathcal{R}(\ell, V)$ captures a small, but systematic effect that relates the average price change to the sign of a trade. The fluctuations around this small signal are large, and increase with $\ell$. A way to see this is to introduce the random variable $u_\ell = (p_{\ell+\epsilon} - p_\ell)x_n$. By definition, $\mathcal{R}(\ell)$ is the average of $u_\ell$, and $\mathcal{D}(\ell)$ is the average of $u_\ell^2$. Since $\mathcal{R}(\ell)$ is roughly constant whereas $\mathcal{D}(\ell)$ grows linearly with $\ell$, one sees that the impact of a given trade (as measured by $\mathcal{R}(\ell)$) rapidly becomes lost in the fluctuations.

In figure 6, we show the whole empirical distribution $P(u_\ell)$ of $u_\ell$ for $\ell = 128$ (other values of $\ell$ will be discussed below). This distribution is found to be only slightly skewed in the direction of positive $u_\ell$. In fact, if one considers the shifted variable $u_\ell - v$, where $v = 0.01$ Euros, the distribution becomes nearly symmetric. Note that 0.01 Euros is equal to half the typical bid–ask spread and can therefore be seen as the minimal cost of a market order.

Empirical price changes are known to be highly Kurtic, with sudden jumps separated by less volatile, random-walk-like periods. Market orders, that incur an immediate cost, are usually interpreted as 'informed' trades. A naive interpretation of an informed trade is a trade that correctly anticipates a price jump thanks to some private information. This foresight of future profits would then justify paying a liquidity cost for immediate execution. On the other hand, noise-induced trades, with no information content, should only temporarily impact the price, and be uncorrelated with the long-run value of the stock. Hence, in this picture, the positive tail of the distribution $P(u_\ell)$ (corresponding to informed trades) should be significantly fatter than the negative tail. Note that this conditional asymmetry is not in contradiction with the diffusive behaviour of price changes.

Now, the nearly symmetric shape of $P(u_\ell - v)$ in figure 6 shows that one can hardly detect the statistical presence of such informed trades, that correctly anticipate the sign of the price change on a short-term basis, so as to cover at least minimal trading costs. One can study this asymmetry more systematically as a function of the time horizon $\ell$. Figure 7 shows a measure of the skewness $\varsigma$ of $P(u_\ell)$ (defined as $\varsigma = f - 1/2$, where $f$ is the fraction of events with $u_\ell > 0$) as a function of $\ell$. We find that $\varsigma \approx \ell^{-1/2}$, as expected if the initial impact of the trade for $\ell \sim 1$ is followed by a pure random walk, uncorrelated with the sign of that trade. This behaviour extends to $\ell = 15000$ (two trading days), beyond which the skewness becomes indistinguishable from zero. Our finding that $\varsigma \approx \ell^{-1/2}$ is hard to reconcile with the idea that a substantial fraction of market orders represent informed trades, in which case $\varsigma$ should decay more slowly than $\ell^{-1/2}$. Correctly predicting a move $L$ in the future indeed leads to a skewness first decaying as $\ell^{-1/2}$ before saturating, for $\ell \sim L$, to a finite value proportional to the fraction of informed trades. The putative information contained in these trades might of course reveal itself on longer timescales (weeks or months) for which we lack statistical accuracy, but we believe that this possibility is extremely unlikely, since the most reliable information should concern short time horizons. Our result is consistent with the conclusion of other studies, where it is established that investors ‘trade too much’ [34], and that the uninformed price pressure is large [7]. Note that $P(u_\ell)$ as defined above gives an equal weight to all trades, independently of their volume. We have also considered the volume-weighted $P(u_\ell)$, which leads to the same qualitative conclusion (see figure 7).

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5 We have used other definitions of the skewness, for example by restricting to only ‘large’ events $|u_\ell| > A\sqrt{\ell}$, with similar conclusions—see figure 7.
Is the above result in contradiction with the idea that the market is informationally efficient? Not necessarily, as explicitly demonstrated by Kyle’s insider trading model [35]. In this model, an insider knows exactly the price of the stock at a certain date $L$ in the future, and manages to place optimally winning trades against noise traders without creating any serial correlation in the price time series. The resulting market is informationally efficient at each instant of time, and the insider’s information is progressively included in the price, with no jumps. The skewness $\varsigma$ then behaves in this model exactly as for a random walk, i.e. as $\ell^{-1/2}$. Correspondingly, the fraction $f$ of informed trades behaves as $L^{-1/2}$ and is not observable if $L$ is large. Typically, for information one day in the future, $L \approx 10^4$ and therefore $f \approx 1\%$, which could be consistent with our observations. However, there are several conceptual inconsistencies in Kyle’s model, which makes it ineligible to describe a real stock market (some improvements have been considered in later work; see [36] for a review). For example, the insider assumed by Kyle is able to sell back all his stocks at time $L$ and take his profit with no impact, which might be justified in the case of a takeover where the transaction price of the stock is agreed upon. But both in Kyle’s model and in real markets, selling back will push the price down; within Kyle’s model the actual profit of the insider for the round trip is actually zero. In fact, Kyle’s model should really be seen as a model of self-fulfilling prophecies, where one trader decides the future value of the stock and trades in such a way that the price indeed reaches this value at the final time. It is clear that within such a framework no profit can ever be made. Another strong assumption of Kyle is that the parameters (such as the number of noise traders or the root mean square of the price variation known to the insider) are known and constant in time. If this is not so, the insiders would be able to profit from anomalously liquid periods and/or anomalously strong information, which should then be revealed in an enhanced skewness $\varsigma$. In summary, we find much more plausible the idea according to which prices are random because they evolve (at least on short timescales) through the mere effect of uninformed trading, rather than being informationally efficient thanks to a vanishingly small fraction of informed trades that delicately balance noise trades. This last scenario, suggested by Kyle’s model, seems to us to be too fragile to apply to real markets. As we will argue below, random price changes emerge naturally from the competition between liquidity takers and liquidity providers, even if the former category has zero information.

2.5. A fluctuation–response relation

In the study of Brownian particles, a very important result that dates back to Einstein relates the diffusion coefficient $D$ to the response of the particle to an external force. That a similar relation might also hold in financial markets was first suggested by Rosenow [37], and substantiated there by some empirical results. We have performed an analysis related to, but different from, that of Rosenow. For any given trading day, one can compute the average local diffusion constant $D(\ell)$ over a given timescale, say $\ell = 128$, and the average local price response $R(\ell)$ over the same timescale. Rosenow, on the other hand, computes a ‘susceptibility’ as the slope of the average price change over a given time interval versus the volume imbalance during the same time interval (see [30]), and relates this susceptibility to the diffusion constant. The analogue of Rosenow’s result [37] (which was motivated by a Langevin equation for price variations—see [38]) is a linear relation between $R^2(\ell)$ and $D(\ell)$, which we illustrate in figure 8 for FT, for two different periods (first semester of 2001, and 2002). A similar result can also be read from figure 3. As will be clear in the following, such a relation will appear naturally within the simple model that we introduce in section 3.

2.6. Long-term correlation of trade signs

All the above results are compatible with a ‘zero-intelligence’ picture of financial markets, where each trade is random in sign and shifts the price permanently, because all other participants update their evaluation of the stock price as a function of the last trade. As shown in [9,10,12–15], a model of the order book based on a purely random order flow indeed allows one to go quite far in the quantitative understanding of financial markets. In this context, the concave shape of the impact as a function of the volume can be understood as an order book effect, where the average size of the queue increases with depth7.

This totally random model of the stock market is however qualitatively incorrect for the following reason. Although, as

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6 Somewhat related results, although not discussed in these terms, can also be found in [23].

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7 However, other effects are probably important to understand this concavity, such as the conditioning of large market orders to the size of the order book—see [7,33].
mentioned above, the statistics of price changes reveals very little temporal correlation, the correlation function of the sign εn of the trades, on the other hand, reveals very slowly decaying correlations as a function of trade time. This correlation has been mentioned in some papers before; see e.g. [7, 27]. Here, we propose that these correlations decay as a power law of the time lag, at least up to ℓ \approx 15 000 (two trading days) beyond which we do not have sufficiently accurate data.

More precisely, one can consider the following correlation function:

\[ C_0(\ell) = \langle \varepsilon_{n+\ell} \varepsilon_n \rangle - \langle \varepsilon_n \rangle^2. \]  

If trades were random, one should observe that \( C_0(\ell) \) decays to zero beyond a few trades. Surprisingly, this is not what happens: on the contrary, \( C_0(\ell) \) is strong and decays very slowly toward zero, as an inverse power law of \( \ell \) (see figure 9):

\[ C_0(\ell) \approx \frac{C_0}{\ell^\gamma}, \quad (\ell \geq 1). \]  

The value of \( \gamma \) seems to be somewhat stock dependent. For example, for FT, one finds \( \gamma \approx 1/5 \), whereas for Total \( \gamma \approx 2/3 \). In their study, Lillo and Farmer found a somewhat larger value of \( \gamma \approx 0.39 \) for Vodafone [17]. In any case, the value of \( \gamma \) is found to be smaller than one, which is very important because the integral of \( C_0(\ell) \) is then divergent. This is in fact the precise definition of ‘long-term’ correlations. Now, as will be shown more precisely in the next section, the integral of \( C_0(\ell) \) can intuitively be thought of as the effective number \( N_\varepsilon \) of correlated successive trades. Hence, out of—say—1000 trades, one should group together

\[ N_\varepsilon \approx 1 + \sum_{\ell=1}^{1000} C_0(\ell) \approx 1 + \frac{C_0}{1 - \gamma} 1000^{1-\gamma}. \]  

3. A micro-model of price fluctuations

3.1. Setup of the model

In order to understand the above results, we will postulate the following trade superposition model, where the price at time
$n$ is written as a sum over all past trades of the impact of one given trade propagated up to time $t^\alpha$: 
\[ p_n = \sum_{n \leq n'} G_0(n - n') \epsilon_{n'} \ln V_{n'} + \sum \eta_n + \epsilon_n, \]  
(12)
where $G_0(\cdot)$ is the ‘bare’ impact function (or propagator) of a single trade, that we assume to be a fixed, non-random function that only depends on time differences (which is a rather strong assumption, see [17]). The $\eta_n$ are also random variables, assumed to be independent from the $\epsilon_n$, and model all sources of price changes not described by the direct impact of the trades: the bid–ask change can as result of some news, or of some order flow, in the absence of any trades. We will in the following assume that the $\eta_n$ are also uncorrelated in time, although this assumption can easily be relaxed. Finally, the $\epsilon_n$ are independent (zero-mean) random variables that can be seen as a high-frequency noise on the position of the bid and of the ask, inducing some noise on the determination of the midpoint (see [16] for a more precise discussion of the origin of this term).

The bare impact function $G_0(\ell)$ represents by definition the average impact of a single trade after $\ell$ trades. It could in principle be measured empirically by launching on the market a sequence of real trades of totally random signs, and averaging the impact over this sample of trades (a potentially costly experiment)$^8$. As will be clear below, the difference between the quantity $\mathcal{R}(\ell)$ introduced in the previous section and $G_0(\ell)$ in fact comes from the strong autocorrelation of the sign of the trades. In order to understand the temporal structure of $G_0(\ell)$, note that a single trade first impacts the midpoint by changing the bid (or the ask). But then the subsequent limit order flow due to that particular trade might either centre on average around the new midpoint (in which case $G_0(\ell)$ would be constant), or, as we will argue below, tend to mean revert toward the previous midpoint (in which case $G_0(\ell)$ decays with $\ell$).

As discussed below (see equation (26)), the asymptotic behaviour of the bare impact function in fact reveals the average cost of a single market order: if $G_0(\ell \gg 1)/G_0(1)$ is small, the cost is large since the initial impact of the trade is only temporary, and is not followed by a true long-term change of the price.

Using this representation, the price increment between an arbitrarily chosen initial time 0 and time $\ell$ is
\[ p_\ell - p_0 = \sum_{0 \leq n < \ell} G_0(\ell - n) \epsilon_n \ln V_n + \sum_{n > 0} \left[ (G_0(n) - n) \epsilon_n \ln V_n + \sum \eta_n + \epsilon_n - \epsilon_0. \right] \]  
(13)
If the signs $\epsilon_n$ were independent random variables, both the response function and the diffusion would be very easy to compute. For example, one would have$^9$
\[ \mathcal{R}_\ell(\ell) = \langle \ln V \rangle G_0(\ell), \]  
(14)
i.e. the observed impact function and the bare response function would be proportional. Similarly, one would have
\[ D_\ell(\ell) = (\ln^2 V) \left( \sum_{0 \leq n < \ell} G_0^2(n) + \sum_{n > 0} G_0(n) - G_0(n) \right)^2 \]
\[ + \Delta(\ell) + 2D_0, \]  
(15)
where $D_0$ is the variance of the $\eta$ and $D_0$ is the variance of the $\epsilon$. In the simplest case of a constant bare impact function, $G_0(\ell) = G_0$ for all $\ell > 0$, one then finds (for $D_0 = 0$) a pure diffusive behaviour, as expected:
\[ D_\ell(\ell) = \ell \langle \ln^2 V \rangle G_0^2 + D_\eta. \]  
(16)
This case (no correlations between the $\epsilon$ and a constant bare impact function) corresponds to the simplest possible zero-intelligence market, where agents are memoryless. However, we have seen that in fact the $\epsilon$ have long range correlations. In this case, the average response function reads
\[ \mathcal{R}_\ell(\ell, V) = \langle \ln V \rangle G_0(\ell) + \sum_{0 \leq n < \ell} G_0(\ell - n) C_1(n) \]
\[ + \sum_{n > 0} (G_0(n + n) - G_0(n)) C_1(n). \]  
(17)
Note in passing that our trade superposition model, equation (12), together with equation (11) leads to the factorization property mentioned above (see figure 5):
\[ \mathcal{R}_\ell(\ell, V) = \frac{\langle \ln V \rangle G_0(\ell)}{(\ln V) \mathcal{R}_\ell(\ell)}. \]  
(18)
Now, one sees more formally the paradox discussed in the previous section: assuming that the impact of each trade is permanent, i.e. $G_0(\ell) = G_0$, leads to
\[ \mathcal{R}_\ell(\ell) = G_0 \left[ \langle \ln V \rangle + \sum_{0 \leq n < \ell} C_1(n) \right]. \]  
(19)
If $C_1(n)$ decays as a power law with an exponent $\gamma < 1$, then the average impact $\mathcal{R}(\ell)$ should grow like $\ell^{1-\gamma}$, and therefore be amplified by a very large factor as $\ell$ increases, at variance with empirical data. The only way out of this conundrum is (within the proposed model) that the bare impact function $G_0(\ell)$ itself should decay with time, in such a way as to offset the amplification effect due to the trade correlations.

### 3.2. A relation between the bare propagator and the sign correlation function

In order to get some guidance, let us now look at the general formula for the diffusion. After a few lines of calculations, one finds
\[ D_\ell(\ell) = (\ln^2 V) \times \left[ \sum_{0 \leq n < \ell} G_0^2(\ell - n) + \sum_{n > 0} (G_0(n + n) - G_0(n)) \right]^2 \]
\[ + 2\Delta(\ell) + 2D_\epsilon + 2D_0. \]  
(20)
where $\Delta(\ell)$ is the correlation-induced contribution:

$$\Delta(\ell) = \sum_{0 \leq n < n' < \ell} G_0(\ell - n)G_0(\ell - n')C_2(n' - n)$$

$$+ \sum_{0 \leq n < n'} [G_0(\ell + n) - G_0(n)][G_0(\ell + n')]$$

$$- G_0(n')]C_2(n' - n) + \sum_{0 \leq n < \ell, n' > 0} G_0(\ell - n)$$

$$\times [G_0(\ell + n') - G_0(n')]C_2(n' + n).$$

The constraint from empirical data is that this expression must be approximately linear in $\ell$. As shown in the appendix, the requirement that $D_0(\ell)$ is strictly linear in $\ell$ for all $\ell$ in fact allows one to express $G_0(\ell)$ as a function of $C_2(\ell)$. Here, we present a simple asymptotic argument. If we make the ansatz that the bare impact function $G_0(\ell)$ also decays as a power law,

$$G_0(\ell) = \frac{\Gamma_0 \ell^\beta}{(\ell_0 + \ell)\beta} \quad (\ell \geq 1)$$

then one can estimate $D_0(\ell)$ in the large-$\ell$ limit. When $\gamma < 1$, one again finds that the correlation-induced term $\Delta(\ell)$ is dominant, and all three terms scale as $\ell^{2-2\gamma}$, provided $\beta < 1$. In other words, the Hurst exponent of price changes is given by $2H = 2 - 2\beta - \gamma$. Therefore, the condition that the fluctuations are diffusive at long times ($H = 1/2$) imposes a relation between the decay of the sign autocorrelation $\gamma$ and the decay of the bare impact function $\beta$ that reads

$$2\beta + \gamma = 1 \to \beta_c = \frac{1 - \gamma}{2}.$$  

For $\beta > \beta_c$, the price is sub-diffusive ($H < 1/2$), which means that price changes show anti-persistence; while for $\beta < \beta_c$, the price is super-diffusive ($H > 1/2$), i.e. price changes are persistent. For FT, $\gamma \approx 1/5$ and therefore $\beta_c \approx 2/5$.

As shown in the appendix, one can in fact obtain an exact relation between $G_0(\ell)$ and $C_2(\ell)$ if one assumes that price changes are strictly uncorrelated (i.e. that $D(\ell)$ is linear in $\ell$ for all $\ell$). The asymptotic analysis of this relation leads, not surprisingly, to the same exponent relation $\beta_c = (1 - \gamma)/2$ as above.

At this stage, there seems still to be a contradiction with empirical data, for if one goes back to the response function given by equation (17), one finds that whenever $\beta + \gamma < 1$ (which is indeed the case for $\beta = \beta_c$ and $\gamma < 1$), the dominant contribution to $R_\ell(\ell)$ should behave as $\ell^{1-\beta-\gamma}$ and thus grow with $\ell$. For example, for $\gamma \approx 1/5$ and $\beta \approx 2/5$, one should find that $R_\ell(\ell) \propto \ell^{2/5}$, which is incompatible with the empirical data of figures 3 and 4. But the surprise comes from the numerical prefactor of this power law. One finds, for large $\ell$,

$$R_\ell(t) \simeq (\ln V) \Gamma_0 C_0 \frac{\Gamma(1 - \gamma)}{\Gamma(\beta) \Gamma(2 - \beta - \gamma)}$$

$$\times \left[ \frac{\pi}{\sin \pi \beta} - \frac{\pi}{\sin \pi (1 - \beta - \gamma)} \right] \ell^{1-\beta-\gamma}.$$  

Therefore, only when $\beta = \beta_c$ is the prefactor exactly zero, and leads to the possibility of a nearly constant impact function! For faster decaying impact functions (larger $\beta$), this prefactor is negative, whereas for more slowly decaying impact functions this prefactor is positive. Interestingly, even if the bare response function $G_0(\ell)$ is positive for all $\ell$, the average response $R_\ell(\ell)$ can become negative for large enough $\beta$, as a consequence of the correlations between trades.

### 3.3. Fitting the average response function

Since the dominant term is zero for the ‘critical’ case $\beta = \beta_c$, and since we are interested in the whole function $R_\ell(\ell)$ (including the small-$\ell$ regime), we have computed $R_\ell(\ell)$ numerically, by performing the discrete sum equation (17) exactly, and fitted it to the empirical response $R$. The results are shown in figure 10. We have fixed the parameters $\gamma$ and $C_0$ to the values extracted from the behaviour of $C_1(\ell)$ (see figure 8): $\gamma = 0.24$ and $C_0 = 0.20$. The overall scaling parameter $\Gamma_0$ is adjusted to match the value of $R(\ell = 1)$. The values of $\beta$ and $\ell_0$ are fitting parameters: we show in figure 10 the response function computed for different values of $\beta$ in the vicinity of $\beta_c = 0.38$, using $\ell_0 = 20$.

The results are compared with the empirical data for FT, showing that one can indeed satisfactorily reproduce, when $\beta \approx \beta_c$, a weakly increasing impact function that reaches a maximum and then decays. One also sees, from figure 10, that the relation between $\beta$ and $\gamma$ must be quite accurately satisfied: otherwise the response function shows a distinct upward trend (for $\beta < \beta_c$) or a downward trend (for $\beta > \beta_c$).

We have tried other simple forms for $G_0(\ell)$, such as a simple exponential decay toward a possibly non-zero asymptotic value, but this leads to unacceptable shapes for $R(\ell)$. Of course, a more precise fit of the initial increase of $R(\ell)$ seen in figure 10 could be achieved by choosing a more complicated function $G_0(\ell)$, that first increases with $\ell$ before decaying to zero.

It is also interesting to use the propagator $G_0^*$ determined in the appendix from the assumption of a purely diffusive price process for all $\ell$. This propagator is plotted in figure 11, and compared to the $G_0$ determined above from the fit of $R(\ell)$. As shown in figure 10, the use of $G_0^*$ does not lead to a very good fit of $R(\ell)$. Since the latter quantity is in fact very sensitive to the chosen form for $G_0$, it does reveal small, but systematic, deviations from a purely diffusive price process. (Note that if one had $C_2(\ell) = C_1(\ell)$, the resulting $R(\ell)$ should be strictly constant.)

### 3.4. Back to the diffusion constant

As we showed above, the reason for the fine tuning of $\beta$ is the requirement that price changes are almost diffusive. We can therefore also compute $D_0(\ell)$ for all values of $\ell$ using the very same values of $\gamma$, $\beta$, $C_0$, $\ell_0$ and $\Gamma_0$. Now, in order to fit the data one has two extra free parameters: $D_0$ and $D_1$ (see equation (20)). With these two extra parameters, one can reproduce the empirical determination of $D(\ell)/\ell$

\[\text{Note that although this prefactor increases (in absolute value) with } \beta \text{ for } \beta > \beta_c, \text{ the power of } \ell \text{ decreases, which means that for large } \ell \text{ the amplitude of } R_\ell(\ell) \text{ decreases with } \beta, \text{ as intuitively expected.} \]

\[\text{The numerical value of } \Gamma_0 \text{ is found to be such that: } \Gamma_0 C_0 = 2.8 \times 10^{-3} \text{ Euros.} \]

\[\text{The former scenario might actually explain the different behaviour of Pechiney seen in figure 4.} \]
Figure 10. Theoretical impact function $R_c(\ell)$, from equation (17), and for different values of $\beta$ close to $\beta_l = 0.38$. The shape of the empirical response function can be quite accurately reproduced using $\beta = 0.42$. The only remaining free parameter is $\ell_0 = 20$. The thick plain curve is $R_c(\ell)$ computed using the ‘pure diffusion’ propagator $G_0^\prime$ determined in the appendix, equation (34). Note that for $\beta > \beta_l$, the response function actually becomes negative at long times, as indeed observed empirically for $\ell > 5000$.

Figure 11. Shape of the bare propagator $G_0$, determined either by the fit of $R_c$ with $\beta = 0.42$ and $\ell_0 = 20$, or using the exact relation, equation (34), derived in the appendix from the assumption of a purely diffusive process.

Figure 12. Diffusion constant $\mathcal{D}(\ell)/\ell$, using equation (20), with the values of $\gamma, \beta, C_0, \ell_0$ and $\Gamma_0$ determined from $R(\ell)$. Two extra parameters were used: $D_0 = 10^{-4}$ and $D_0 = 3.3 \times 10^{-5}$ (both in Euro squared). The lower graph is the ‘impact contribution’ to $D(\ell)$, given by equation (20) with $D_0 = 0$. The ‘oscillations’ at long times are a numerical artefact.

\[ \ell \gg 1 \] where the effect of $D_0$ can be neglected,

\[ \frac{D(\ell)}{\ell} = Z' (\ln V)^2 C_0 \Gamma_0^2 + D_0, \quad R_c(\ell) = Z' (\ln V) \Gamma_0 C_0, \]

(25)

where $Z$ and $Z'$ are numerical constants. Assuming that from one day to the next both the average (log-)traded volume and the impact $\Gamma_0$ of each individual trade might change, while $C_0$ is fixed, immediately leads to the affine relation between $\mathcal{D}$ and $\mathcal{R}^2$ reported in section 2.5.

3.5. Discussion

The conclusion of this section is that our ‘micro-model’ of prices, equation (12), can be used as a theoretical canvas to rationalize and interpret the empirical results found in the previous section. Most surprising is the constraint that the empirical results impose on the shape of the ‘bare’ response function $G_0$, which is found to be a slowly decaying power law which must precisely cancel the slowly decaying autocorrelation of the trades, but reveals systematic deviations from a pure diffusion process, hardly noticeable in the diffusion constant itself. The fact that the bare impact function decays with time (at least on intraday timescales) in a finely tuned way to compensate the long memory in the trades is the central result of this paper. This effect is lost in the zero-intelligence models of Poissonian order flows, where, after decreasing during a short transient, the impact of each trade becomes permanent: $G_0(\ell) \rightarrow G_\infty > 0$. On this point, see the model studied in [14], where it is shown that prices are confined (sub-diffusive) on timescales shorter than the lifetime of limit orders, essentially as a consequence of the shape of the order book. In fact, both the long-time memory of the trades and the slowly relaxing impact function reported here must be the consequence of the strategic behaviour of market participants,
that we discuss below in order to get an intuitive understanding of the mechanisms at play.

Although our detailed analysis concerns FT, it is clear that our conclusions are more general, since the strong autocorrelations in the trade signs, the near constancy of the average response function and the diffusive nature of price changes have been observed on all stocks, with only quantitative changes (see figures 2 and 4). It would be interesting to document these quantitative differences, and relate these to liquidity, or to the size of the bid–ask spread.

Finally, it would be very interesting to know whether the bare response function levels off to a finite value for large time lags; this will require more data to go beyond the analysis of the present paper to enlarge the available range of \( \ell \) values. However, it seems reasonable to expect that \( G_0(\ell) \) should indeed reach a finite asymptotic value for values of \( \ell \) corresponding to a few days of trading\(^{14}\).

4. Critical balance of opposite forces: market orders versus limit orders

Although trading occurs for a large variety of reasons, it is useful to recognize that traders organize in two broad categories.

- One is that of ‘liquidity takers’, that trigger trades by putting in market orders. The motivation for this category of traders might be to take advantage of some ‘information’, and make a profit from correctly anticipating future price changes. Information can in fact be of very different nature: fundamental (firm based), macro-economical, political, statistical (based on regularities of price patterns), etc. Unfortunately, information is often hard to interpret correctly—except of course for insiders—and it is probable that many of these ‘information’-driven trades are misguided (on this point, see \([7, 34]\) and references therein, and the discussion in section 2.4). For example, systematic hedge funds which take decisions based on statistical pattern recognition have a typical success rate of only 52%. There is no compelling reason to believe that the intuition of traders in market rooms is of very different nature: fundamental (firm based), macro-economical, political, statistical (based on regularities of price patterns), etc.

- The other category is that of ‘liquidity providers’ (or ‘market makers’, although on electronic markets all participants can act as liquidity providers by putting in limit orders), who offer to buy or to sell but avoid taking any bare position on the market. Their profit comes from the bid–ask spread \( s(t) = a(t) - b(t) \).

14 Hopman quotes three days as the time beyond which the autocorrelation of the trades sign falls to zero \([7]\), whereas we find that the power-law decay of this correlation persists up to at least two days of trading.

This is where the game becomes interesting. Assume that a liquidity taker wants to buy, so that an increased number of buy orders arrive on the market. The liquidity provider is tempted to increase the offer (or ask) price \( a \) because the buyer might be informed and really know that the current price is too low and that it will most probably increase in the near future. Should this happen, the liquidity provider, who has to close his position later, might have to buy back at a much higher price and experience a loss. On the other hand, liquidity takers obviously need to place small orders, since large orders would trigger a sudden increase of \( a \) and make their trade costly. This is the rationale for dividing one’s order into small chunks and dispersing these as much as possible over time so as not to appear on the ‘radar screens’. Doing so liquidity takers necessarily create some temporal correlations in the sign of the trades. Since these traders probably have a somewhat broad spectrum of volumes to trade \([39]\)\(^{15}\), and therefore of trading horizons (from a few minutes to several weeks), this can easily explain the slow, power-law decay of the sign correlation function \( C_0(\ell) \) reported above.

Now, if the market orders in fact do not contain useful information but are the result of hedging, noise trading, misguided interpretations, errors etc, then the price should not move up in the long run, and should eventually mean revert to its previous value. Liquidity providers are obviously the active force behind this mean reversion, again because closing their position will be costly if the price has moved up too far from the initial price. More precisely, a computation of the liquidity provider average gain per share \( G \) can be performed \([16]\), and is found to be, for trades of volume \( V \),

\[
G = s + R(0, V) - R(\infty, V) = s + \ln V[R(0) - R(\infty)],
\]

where \( R(0, V) \) is the intermediate average impact of a trade, before new limit orders set in. We have in fact checked empirically that \( R(0, V) \approx R(1, V) \). From the above formula, one sees that it is in the interest of liquidity providers to mean revert the price, so as to make \( R(\infty) \) as small as possible. However, this mean reversion cannot take place too quickly, again because a really informed trader would then be able to buy a large volume at a modest price. Hence, this mean reversion must be slow. From the quantitative analysis of section 3, we have found that there is hardly any mean reversion at all on short timescales \( \ell < \ell_0 \) (perhaps even a small trend following effect, see figure 10), and that this mean reversion must be described as a slow power law for larger \( \ell \). Actually, the action of liquidity providers and liquidity takers must be such that no (or very little) linear correlation is created in the price changes, otherwise statistical arbitrage opportunities would be created at the detriment of one or the other population.

To summarize: liquidity takers must dilute their orders and create long-range correlations in the trade signs, whereas liquidity providers must correctly handle the fact that liquidity takers might either possess useful information (a rare situation, but that can be very costly since the price can jump as a result

\(^{15}\) We associate the power-law distribution of investors’ size with the long-range correlations reported here rather than with the power-law tail of return, as advocated in the above cited paper.
of some significant news), or might not be informed at all and trade randomly. By controlling the order flow so as to slowly mean revert the price, liquidity providers minimize the probability that they either sell too low, or have to buy back too high. The delicate balance between these conflicting tendencies conspires to put the market at the border between persistence (if mean reversion is too weak, i.e. $\beta < \bar{\beta}$) and anti-persistence (if mean reversion is too strong, i.e. $\beta > \bar{\beta}$), and eliminate arbitrage opportunities. Therefore, the mere fact of trading so as to minimize impact for liquidity takers, and to optimize gains for liquidity providers, does lead to a random walk dynamics of the price, even in the absence of any real information underlying the trades.

It is actually enlightening to propose a simple model that could explain how liquidity providers enforce mean reversion\(^{16}\). Assume that upon placing limit orders, liquidity providers induce a systematic bias toward some moving average of past prices. If this average is for simplicity taken to be an exponential moving average, the continuous time description of this will read

$$\frac{d p_t}{dt} = -\Omega (p_t - \bar{p}_t) + \xi_t$$

$$\frac{d \bar{p}_t}{dt} = \kappa (p_t - \bar{p}_t),$$

where $\xi_t$ is the random driving force due to trading, $\Omega$ the inverse timescale for the strength of the mean reversion and $1/\kappa$ the ‘memory’ time over which the average price $\bar{p}_t$ is computed. The first equation means that liquidity providers tend to mean revert the price toward $\bar{p}_t$, while the second describes the update of the exponential moving average $\bar{p}_t$ with time. This set of linear equations can be solved, and leads to a solution of the form $p_t = \int \tau \, d\tau' \, G_\Omega(t - \tau') \xi_{\tau'}$, with a bare propagator given by

$$G_\Omega(t) = (1 - G_\infty) \exp[-(\Omega + \kappa)t] + G_\infty,$$

i.e. an exponential decay toward a finite asymptotic value $G_\infty = \kappa/(\Omega + \kappa)$. Note that, interestingly, it is the self-referential effect that leads to a non-zero asymptotic impact. If the fundamental price is known to all, $\kappa = 0$ and $G_\infty = 0$. In the opposite limit where $\kappa \gg \Omega$, the last price is taken as the reference price, and $G_\infty \to 1$. A way to obtain $G_\Omega(t)$ resembling a power law is to assume that different liquidity providers use different time horizons to compute a reasonable reference price. This leads to a $G_\infty(t)$ which is written as the sum of time exponentials with different rates which can easily mimic a pure power law.

The message of the above model is actually quite interesting from the point of view of efficient markets: it suggests that nobody really knows what the correct reference price should be, and that its best proxy is in fact its own past average over some time window (the length of which is itself distributed over several timescales among market participants).

\(^{16}\) We have in fact directly checked on the data that the evolution of the midpoint between trades (resulting from the order flow) is indeed anticorrelated with the impact of the trades. On this point, see [7], where the limit order flow subsequent to a trade is studied. See however the very recent preprint of Lillo and Farmer [17], where they show that the dominant cause of the mean reversion is not due to a change of bid–ask, but to a bias on the bid and ask volumes in such a way to favour a bounce-back of the midpoint.

5. Summary and conclusion

The aim of this paper was to study in detail the statistics of price changes at the trade by trade level, and to analyse the interplay between the impact of each trade on the price and the volatility. Empirical data show that

(a) the price (midpoint) process is close to being purely diffusive, even at the trade by trade scale,

(b) the temporal structure of the impact function first increases and reaches a maximum after 100–1000 trades, before decreasing again, with a rather limited overall variation (typically a factor of two) and

(c) the sign of the trades shows surprisingly long-range (power-law) correlations, at least up to 15 000 trades (two trading days).

The paradox is that if the impact of each trade were permanent, the price process should be strongly super-diffusive and the average response function should increase by a large factor as a function of the time-lag.

As a possible resolution of this paradox, we have proposed a micro-model of prices, equation (12), where the price at any instant is the causal result of all past trades, mediated by what we called a bare impact function, or propagator $G_\Omega$. All the empirical results can be reconciled if one assumes that this bare propagator also decays as a power law in time, with an exponent which is precisely tuned to a critical value, ensuring simultaneously that prices are diffusive on long timescales and that the response function is nearly constant. Therefore, the seemingly trivial random walk behaviour of price changes in fact results from a fine-tuned competition between two opposite effects, one leading to super-diffusion (the autocorrelation of trades) and the other leading to sub-diffusion (the decay of the bare impact function). The cancellation is however not exact: the non-trivial behaviour of the average response function allows one to detect small, but systematic deviations from a purely diffusive behaviour, deviations that are hardly detectable on the price fluctuations themselves.

In financial terms, the competition is between liquidity takers, that create long-range correlations by dividing their trading volume into small quantities, and liquidity providers, that adapt the order flow so as to mean revert the price and to optimize their gains (see equation (26)). The resulting absence of linear correlations in price changes, and therefore of arbitrage opportunities, is often postulated a priori in the economics literature, but the details of the mechanism that removes these arbitrage opportunities are rather obscure. The main message of this paper is that the random walk nature of price changes on short (intraday) timescales is not due to the unpredictable nature of incoming news, but appears as a dynamical consequence of the competition between the above antagonistic constraints on market participants.

The role of real (and correctly interpreted) information appears to be rather thin: the fact that the intraday volatility of a stock is nearly equal to its long-time value suggests that the volatility is mostly due to the trading activity itself, which is dominated by noise trades. This result is most probably one of
the mechanisms needed to explain the excess volatility puzzle first raised by Shiller [3]. We have in fact defined a model-independent indicator of the fraction of ‘informed’ trades as the asymmetry (or skewness) of the probability distribution of the signed price variation, where the sign is that of the trade at the initial time. If some market orders correctly anticipate large events, this should generate a detectable positive skew of this distribution. Due to these trades, the skewness of the distribution should decay more slowly than $1/\sqrt{T}$, which is the benchmark result for a simple random walk impacted by the initial trade. However, consistently with other studies [7, 34], our empirical results only show very weak asymmetry, barely sufficient to cover trading costs. The skewness is found to decay as $1/\sqrt{T}$. This suggests that only a very small fraction of these market orders can a posteriori be described as truly informed, whereas most trades can be classified as noise. The remarkable long-range persistence of the sign of these trades is in this respect even more striking, since one could have expected that ‘noise’ trading would be uncorrelated in time.

The conclusion that price changes are to a large extent induced by the trading activity itself seems to imply that the price will, in the long run, wander arbitrarily far from the fundamental price, which would be absurd. But even if one assumes that the fundamental price is independent of time, a typical 3% noise-induced daily volatility would lead to a significant (say a factor of two) difference between the traded price and the fundamental price only after a few years [40]. Since the fundamental price of a company is probably difficult to determine better than within a factor to two, say (see e.g. [5, 41]), one only expects fundamental effects to limit the volatility on very long timescales (as indeed suggested by the empirical results of de Bondt and Thaler [42]), but that these are probably negligible on the short (intraday) timescales of interest in this paper. We have in fact seen (cf equation (27)) that the reference price that market participants seem to have in mind is in fact a short-time average of the past price itself, rather than any fundamental price.

From a more general standpoint, our finding that the absence of arbitrage opportunities results from a critical balance between antagonistic effects is quite interesting. It might justify several claims made in the (eco-)physics literature that the anomalies in price statistics (fat tails in returns described by power laws [21, 22], long-range self-similar volatility correlations [25, 26] and the long-range correlations in signs reported here and in [17]) are due to the presence of a critical point in the vicinity of which the market operates (see e.g. [43], and in the context of financial markets [44, 45]). If a fine-tuned balance between two competing effects is needed to ensure absence of arbitrage opportunities, one should expect that fluctuations are crucial, since a local imbalance between the competing forces can lead to an instability. In this respect, the analogy with the balancing of a long stick is quite enticing [20]. In more financial terms, the breakdown of the conditions for this dynamical equilibrium is, for example, a liquidity crisis: a sudden cooperativity of market orders, that lead to an increase of the trade sign correlation function, can out-weigh the liquidity providers’ stabilizing (mean-reverting) role, and lead to crashes. This suggests that one should be able to write a mathematical model, inspired by our results, to describe this ‘on–off intermittency’ scenario, advocated (although in a different context) in [20, 46, 47].

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Appendix. The case of a strictly diffusive process
This appendix was inspired by a remark of Xavier Gabaix. There is one particular case of our micro-model of prices, equation (12), where prices are purely diffusive at all times (rather than only asymptotically). This is the case provided a specific relation between the bare propagator $G_0$ and the sign correlation function $C_2(\ell)$ holds. In order to show this, let us assume that the random variable $q_n \equiv \varepsilon_n \ln V_n$ can be written as

$$q_n = \sum_{m \leq n} K(n - m) \xi_m,$$  \hspace{1cm} (29)

where $\xi_n$ are uncorrelated random variables ($\langle \xi_n \xi_m \rangle = (\ln^2 V) \delta_{n,m})$, and $K(\cdot)$ a certain kernel. In order for the $q_n$ to have the required correlations, the kernel $K(\cdot)$ should obey the following equation:

$$C_2(n) = (\ln^2 V) \sum_{m \geq 0} K(m + n) K(m).$$  \hspace{1cm} (30)

In the case where $C_2$ decays as $\ell^{-\gamma}$ with $0 < \gamma < 1$, it is easy to show that the asymptotic decay of $K(n)$ should also be a power law $n^{-\delta}$ with $2\delta - 1 = \gamma$. Note that $1/2 < \delta < 1$.

Inverting equation (29) allows one to obtain a set of uncorrelated random variables $\xi_n$ from a set of correlated variables $q_n$:

$$\xi_n = \sum_{m \leq n} Q(n - m) q_m,$$  \hspace{1cm} (31)

where $Q$ is the matrix inverse of $K$, such that $\sum_{m=0}^n K(n - m) Q(m) = \delta_{n,m}$. Equations (29) and (31) in fact form the basis of linear filter theories, and $\xi_n$ can be seen as the prediction error on the next variable $q_n$. 

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Introducing discrete Laplace transforms, 
\[ \hat{K}(E) = \sum_{n \geq 0} K(n)e^{-nE} \quad \hat{Q}(E) = \sum_{n \geq 0} Q(n)e^{-nE}, \] (32)

one finds \( \hat{K}(E)\hat{Q}(E) = 1 \). For a power-law kernel \( K(\cdot) \), one obtains \( \hat{Q}(E) \propto E^{-\delta} \) for \( E \to 0 \), and therefore \( Q(n) \propto n^{\delta-2} \) for large \( n \). It is useful to note that in this case \( \hat{Q}(E = 0) = \sum_{n \geq 0} Q(n) = 0 \).

Now, it is clear that if one defines the price process \( p_n \) as
\[ p_n = \sum_{m<n} \xi m, \] (33)
then \( p_n \) is a diffusion process with a strictly linear \( D(\cdot) \), since the \( \xi \) are by construction uncorrelated. The price defined in this way can also be written, using equation (31), as a linear combination of past \( q_m \), as assumed in our micro-model equation (12), with
\[ G_0^\ell(\ell) = \sum_{m=0}^{\ell-1} Q(m). \] (34)

This is an exact relation between \( C_2 \) (that allows one to compute in turn \( K \) and \( Q \)) and the response function \( G_0^\ell \) for all \( \ell \), where the star indicates that strict diffusion is imposed.

In the case of power-law kernels, one finds from the above relation and from \( Q(n) \propto n^{\delta-2} \) for large \( n \)
\[ G_0^\ell(\ell) \propto \ell^{\delta-1} \longrightarrow \beta = 1 - \delta = \frac{1 - \gamma}{2}, \] (35)

which is, not surprisingly, the relation obtained in the main text from the assumption that prices are diffusive on long timescales.

Equation (34) can be used to construct \( G_0^\ell \) from the empirical determination of \( C_2 \), shown in figure 11. In order to obtain this curve, we have fitted \( C_2(n) \) as
\[ C_2(0) = 33.5; \quad C_2(n) = \frac{7.16}{(1.95 + n)^{0.285}}, \] (36)
and used the Levinson–Durbin recursion algorithm for solving a Toeplitz system (see, e.g., [48]).

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